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Abstract
Bayesian deep learning is recently regarded as an intrin-
sic way to characterize the weight uncertainty of deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs). Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynam-
ics (SGLD) is an effective method to enable Bayesian deep
learning on large-scale datasets. Previous theoretical studies
have shown various appealing properties of SGLD, ranging
from the convergence properties to the generalization bounds.
In this paper, we study the properties of SGLD from a novel
perspective of membership privacy protection (i.e., prevent-
ing the membership attack). The membership attack, which
aims to determine whether a specific sample is used for train-
ing a given DNN model, has emerged as a common threat
against deep learning algorithms. To this end, we build a the-
oretical framework to analyze the information leakage (w.r.t.
the training dataset) of a model trained using SGLD. Based on
this framework, we demonstrate that SGLD can prevent the
information leakage of the training dataset to a certain extent.
Moreover, our theoretical analysis can be naturally extended
to other types of Stochastic Gradient Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (SG-MCMC) methods. Empirical results on different
datasets and models verify our theoretical findings and sug-
gest that the SGLD algorithm can not only reduce the infor-
mation leakage but also improve the generalization ability of
the DNN models in real-world applications.
Introduction
Bayesian deep learning has received increasing atten-
tion from the research community over the past few
years, due to its effectiveness to capture weight un-
certainty and alleviate overfitting in deep neural net-
works (DNNs) (Blundell et al. 2015; Li et al. 2016a). The
key ingredient of Bayesian deep learning is sampling
from the Bayesian posterior. To enable the posterior
sampling, there are typically two different types of ap-
proaches, namely, Stochastic Variational Inference (SVI)
and Stochastic Gradient Markov Chain Monte Carlo (SG-
MCMC). One representative work of SVI is Bayes-by-
Backprop (Blundell et al. 2015) that enables the variational
inference of DNNs. These SVI based methods in the realm
of deep learning always assume that the Bayesian posterior
can be decomposed into separable Gaussian distributions,
which may lead to non-negligible approximation error and
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underestimation of the weight uncertainty (Li et al. 2016a).
Such SVI based approaches can hardly scale to large
datasets and difficult to handle complex model structures,
thus limit their applicability for deep learning models.
To enable Bayesian learning at scale, SG-MCMC is
proposed as an alternative to SVI (Welling and Teh 2011;
Chen, Fox, and Guestrin 2014). Stochastic Gradient
Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) is one of the most popular
SG-MCMC methods. The key idea of SGLD is apply-
ing stochastic optimization (Robbins and Monro 1951)
to Langevin Dynamics (Neal and others 2011), which
is implemented by injecting proper Gaussian noise to
the gradient estimation of a mini-batch sampled from
the training dataset (Welling and Teh 2011). SGLD
can also be regarded as an effective way to approx-
imately sample from the Bayesian posterior distribu-
tion (Sato and Nakagawa 2014). It has been successfully
applied to a number of real-world applications, such as
language modeling (Gan et al. 2017) and shape classifica-
tion (Li et al. 2016b). Among these practical applications,
various theoretical studies have shown different ap-
pealing properties of SGLD (Sato and Nakagawa 2014;
Mou et al. 2018). Most of these theoretical works focus on
analyzing the convergence properties of SGLD. Besides the
convergenceproperties, some recent works also attempted to
study the generalization bounds of SGLD (Mou et al. 2018;
Pensia, Jog, and Loh 2018).
In this paper, we specifically study the properties of
SGLD from the perspective of membership privacy. Some
recent studies showed that a well-trained DNN model
may unintentionally expose the private information of the
training dataset (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015;
Shokri et al. 2017). The membership at-
tack (Shokri et al. 2017) has emerged as a common
threat to detect the membership information of the training
dataset armed with the learned model. Given the trained
model and a specific sample, the membership attack aims
to infer whether this given sample is used for training
the given model. Our work is motivated by some recent
works that study the connection between the overfitting
and the information leakage of DNNs, which shows that
the less overfitting a model is, the less information is
disclosed by the model (Wu et al. 2019a; Yeom et al. 2018;
Wu et al. 2019b).
To this end, we first build the theoretical framework to an-
alyze the information leakage of the learned model. Specifi-
cally, we employ the optimal membership attack proposed in
a previous work (Sablayrolles et al. 2019) as a workhorse to
compute the membership privacy leakage loss. This loss can
be used for quantitatively characterizing the model’s vulner-
ability to the membership attack. Based on the theoretical
framework, we then prove that, for a model trained using
SGLD, its membership privacy leakage loss can be bounded
in expectation by a uniform constant for arbitrary samples.
This finding further indicates that the model trained using
SGLD can prevent the membership attack to a certain extent
(formalized in Theorem 1).
The most related work to ours was conducted by
Wang, Fienberg, and Smola (2015), in which they intro-
duced DP-SGLD that satisfies the differential privacy pro-
tocol (Dwork 2011). Our work differs from this work in
two aspects. First, our theoretical analysis can be conducted
without modifying the vanilla SGLD algorithm and can be
easily extended to other SG-MCMC methods. Second, dif-
ferential privacy is a strict requirement for most real appli-
cations and leads to a significant performance drop to meet
the given privacy budget. DP-SGLD suffers such a perfor-
mance drop (Wang, Fienberg, and Smola 2015). In contrast,
we relax the requirement of differential privacy and focus
on studying membership privacy (instead of differential pri-
vacy) afforded by SGLD.
Moreover, we build the theoretical connection between
DP-SGLD and our framework (see more details in the sec-
tion of theoretical analysis). Our theoretical analysis can
be further naturally extended to other types of SG-MCMC
methods, such as Stochastic Gradient Hamiltonian Monte
Carlo (SGHMC) (Chen, Fox, and Guestrin 2014).
To verify our theoretical findings, we perform member-
ship attacks on different real-world datasets to evaluate the
information leakage of models trained with different op-
timization methods (e.g. SGD and SGLD). Empirical re-
sults show that SGLD can significantly reduce the informa-
tion leakage of the training dataset in contrast to SGD and
its variants. Besides, we also observe that SGLD can pre-
vent DNNs from overfitting in some cases, which implicitly
verifies the connection between overfitting and information
leakage (Yeom et al. 2018).
In summary, our contributions are three folds:
• We introduce a theoretical framework to analyze the
membership information leakage of a well-trained DNN
model.
• With the theoretical framework, we show that the model
trained using SGLD can prevent the membership attack to
a certain extent.
• Our framework provides a uniform interpretation for
some previous theoretical results by incorporating them
into our framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first pro-
vide a brief review of the related work. We then demonstrate
the theoretical analysis, including the membership privacy
analysis framework and our main theoretical results, fol-
lowed by the the empirical results to validate our theoretical
findings. Finally, we conclude our work in the last section.
Related Work
Bayesian Deep Learning. Avoiding overfitting of the
deep learning model is a longstanding goal for the
research community. Bayesian deep learning is re-
cently regarded as an intrinsic way to eliminate over-
fitting through ensembling models sampled from the
Bayesian posterior (i.e. approximate Bayesian infer-
ence) (Blundell et al. 2015). As the Bayesian posterior
is always intractable in practice, there are normally two
different ways to approximate the posterior sampling, i.e.
Stochastic Variational Inference (SVI) (Blundell et al. 2015)
and Stochastic Gradient Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (SG-MCMC) (Welling and Teh 2011;
Chen, Fox, and Guestrin 2014). The key idea of SVI
based methods is to use a parameterized variational distri-
bution to approximate the real posterior. The approximation
can be further transformed into an optimization prob-
lem. To bring this idea into the realm of deep learning,
previous works always come at the assumption that the
Bayesian posterior of the parameters can be decomposed
into separable Gaussian distributions (Blundell et al. 2015;
Li et al. 2016a). However, this assumption is always
violated, which leads to non-negligible approximation
error (Li et al. 2016a). An alternative way is to use SG-
MCMC methods. In contrast to SVI based methods, the
key idea of SG-MCMC is to approximately sample from
the real posterior instead of directly approximating the
posterior (Welling and Teh 2011). There are various SG-
MCMC methods, including Stochastic Gradient Langevin
Dynamics (SGLD) and Stochastic Gradient Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (SGHMC) (Chen, Fox, and Guestrin 2014). In
this paper, we focus on studying privacy related properties
of SGLD, one of the most commonly used SG-MCMC
methods.
SGLD. The idea of combining stochastic optimiza-
tion (Robbins and Monro 1951) and Langevin Dynamics
(Neal and others 2011) was first presented in the work
(Welling and Teh 2011), in which the authors proposed
Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) to effi-
ciently performBayesian learning on large-scale datasets. In
contrast to SGD, SGLD injects proper Gaussian noise into
the gradient estimation to avoid collapsing to just the maxi-
mum a posterior (MAP) solution. Since then, many variants
of SGLD are introduced to improve the vanilla SGLD al-
gorithm. For example, Li et al. (2016a) proposed pSGLD,
imposing a preconditioner to the optimization process for
improving the convergence efficacy of SGLD. Besides the
algorithmic improvements of SGLD, there are a number of
works focusing on applying SGLD to various applications
(Li et al. 2016b; Gan et al. 2017). For instance, Gan et al.
(2017) proposed using SGLD to mitigate the overfitting of
RNNmodels and achieved remarkable performances on sev-
eral language modeling tasks. Among the above-mentioned
works, there is another research direction to study the the-
oretical properties of SGLD. One of the most important
properties of SGLD is that it can approximate the sampling
from the posterior distribution (Sato and Nakagawa 2014;
Chen, Ding, and Carin 2015). This property has been theo-
retically studied in different works. A popular way is to con-
duct the approximation analysis of SGLD from the perspec-
tive of stochastic differential equations. A recent research
trend considers the generalization bound of the SGLD
algorithms under different assumptions (Mou et al. 2018;
Pensia, Jog, and Loh 2018). In this paper, we take a totally
different view, to study SGLD from the aspect of member-
ship privacy.
Membership Attack. The privacy leakage issue of ma-
chine learning models has attracted ever-rising inter-
ests from both the machine learning and security com-
munities. Recently, membership attacks have arisen as
a common threat model against machine learning al-
gorithms (Leino and Fredrikson 2019; Shokri et al. 2017;
Long et al. 2018). A pioneering work (Shokri et al. 2017)
investigated the risk of membership attacks on different
machine learning models. Specifically, they developed a
shadow training technique to obtain an attack model in the
black-box setting (i.e., without knowing the machine learn-
ing model structure and parameters). Carlini et al. (2018)
proposed a metric to measure the vulnerability of deep learn-
ing models. A recent work (Sablayrolles et al. 2019) intro-
duced the concept of the optimal attack and employed the
Bayes theorem to derive a formulation for the attack. In this
paper, we take the membership attack as the workhorse for
evaluating the information leakage of deep learning models
trained using SGLD.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the properties of the
SGLD algorithm from different aspects that are related to
privacy protection. We first introduce some basic notations
and settings, including the SGLD algorithm and the mem-
bership attack. Then we build the theoretical framework to
characterize the information leakage of the trained model.
Based on the framework, we demonstrate the main theo-
retical finding of this paper, i.e., the model trained using
SGLD can preserve the membership privacy (preventing the
membership attack). At last, we provide some other theoret-
ical perspectives and show how to incorporate them into our
framework, which helps us to give a uniform understanding
of the SGLD algorithm.
Notation and Setting
We start with basic notations and settings. In this paper, we
focus on the classification task. Note that our analysis can
be easily extended to other types of learning problems, such
as regression. In a supervised classification task, there is a
labeled training datasetD = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, where x denotes
the input data (e.g. an image in the image classification task)
and y denotes the associated label. For simplicity, we denote
zi = (xi, yi) as a data-label pair or a sample. The goal of
a deep learning modelM (e.g. a DNN model) is to assign a
probability to each possible label y, i.e. M is a probabilistic
model that computes p(y|x; θ) = f(x, θ), where θ denotes
the weight parameters of M and f denotes the inference of
M. A typical loss used for optimizing θ is the negative log-
likelihood which satisfies the following equation:
L(D, θ) =
∑
zi∈D
l(zi, θ), (1)
where l(z, θ) is the negative log-likelihood over the individ-
ual sample z = (x, y), i.e. l(z, θ) = − log(p(y|x; θ)).
SGLD. SGLD can be regarded as an effective optimization
method that incorporates uncertainty into the weight param-
eter. Based on the above notations, we can define the updat-
ing rule of SGLD as:
θt+1 = θt − (
ǫt
2
∂θL(Bt, θt) + ηt), ηt ∼ N (0, ǫtI), (2)
L(Bt, θt) = − log p(θt) +
|D|
|Bt|
∑
zi∈Bt
l(zi, θt), (3)
where p(θt) is the prior of θt and ǫt is the step size.
N (0, ǫtI) denotes the Gaussian distribution. L(Bt, θt) can
be seen as a stochastic approximation of Equation (1), which
is to compute the negative log-likelihood over the mini-batch
Bt that is randomly selected from the whole dataset D.
Previous studies always assume the step size de-
creases towards zero at the rate that satisfies some condi-
tions (Welling and Teh 2011). Due to this assumption, in-
tuitively, the optimization process of SGLD can be divided
into two phases in terms of the step size. In the initial phase,
the stochastic gradient noise1 will dominate the optimization
process due to the large step size. The SGLD algorithm in
this phase can be seen as an efficient stochastic gradient de-
scent algorithm. The initial phase is also called as the burn-in
phase in the literature (Welling and Teh 2011). In the later
phase, the injected Gaussian noise will dominate the pro-
cess as the step size gets smaller. The parameter obtained by
the SGLD algorithm in this phase can be seen as sampling
from the true posterior distribution. More rigorous descrip-
tions can be found in prior works (Welling and Teh 2011).
Membership Attack. The membership attack refers to in-
ferring whether a specific sample is used for training the
model. Formally, given a specific sample z = (x, y) and
a DNN model M with the parameter θ, the attacker aims
to compute the probability that the sample belongs to the
training data. Here we denote the probability as P (m =
1|z, θ), where m refers to the sample’s membership and
m = 1 indicates that the sample is in the training dataset.
Besides the knowledge of the trained model, the attacker
may also hold an extra dataset S, which consists of sam-
ples from the training/hold-out datasets. We call this dataset
“shadow dataset” borrowed from the prior work2. We de-
note this dataset as S = {(zi,mi)}ni=1, where each zi is
a sample of (xi, yi) and mi represents the membership of
this sample. The samples with mi = 1 are from the train-
ing dataset, otherwise, are from the hold-out dataset. Based
on the above setting, the attacker can employ the shadow
dataset S to assist the membership inference, which is to
1The noise is caused by the random sampling.
2This can also be seen as the side information in the literature.
compute the probability P (m = 1|z, θ,S). Based on the
previous work (Sablayrolles et al. 2019), we call the exact
value of P (m = 1|z, θ,S) as the optimal attack. In prac-
tice, the optimal attack is always intractable thus previ-
ous works have proposed different methods to approximate
P (m = 1|z, θ,S) (Sablayrolles et al. 2019). In what fol-
lows, we introduce our theoretical framework to analyze the
information leakage (in the aspect of membership privacy)
of the learned deep learning models.
Membership Privacy Analytical Framework
We further assume the ratio of training samples3 in S is λ.
Thus we can give a trivial attack solution that proceeds as
P (m = 1|z, θ,S) ≈ P (m = 1) = λ. In contrast to the
optimal attack mentioned above, we call this attack as the
trivial attack, since this attack gets nothing other than the
macroscopical information of the shadow dataset. We can
define the membership privacy leakage (Mpl) loss of a given
sample as:
Mpl(z, θ,S) = max(P (m = 1|z, θ,S)− λ, 0). (4)
In the above equation, when P (m = 1|z, θ,S) ≤ λ, the op-
timal attack infers that the sample z is not from the training
dataset. Thus we set the Mpl loss to zero since the optimal
attack do not induce the membership leakage of the training
dataset. The expectation of the Mpl loss over all possible
samples (i.e. Ez[Mpl(z, θ,S)]) can evaluate the difference
between the optimal attack and the trivial attack. Obviously,
the smaller the expectation of the Mpl loss is, the less infor-
mation of the training dataset is revealed by the model (i.e.
the optimal attack is more similar to the trivial attack). To
compute the loss, we need to give an implicit formulation of
the optimal attack. In this paper, we introduce a modified
version of the formulation proposed by Sablayrolles et al.
(2019). To this end, we first define the posterior distribution
over the parameter (while S is given) by:
pS(θ) = p(θ|ST ),ST = {(zi,mi) ∈ S : mi = 1}. (5)
With a slight modification of the prior
work (Sablayrolles et al. 2019), we can obtain:
Lemma 1 (Sablayrolles et al. 2019) Given a learned model
with parameter θ, the shadow dataset S, and a specific sam-
ple z, the Mpl loss can be computed using:
P (m = 1|z, θ,S) = σ(s(z, θ, pS) + tλ), (6)
where tλ is log(
λ
1− λ
) and σ(t) := 1/(1 + e−t) is the sig-
moid function. We call s the measure score which satisfies
the following equations:
tp(z) = − logEθ∼pe
−l(z,θ),
s(z, θ, p) = tp(z)− l(z, θ).
We can further use the Lipschitz continuity of σ that |σ(u)−
σ(v)| ≤ |u− v|/4 and λ = σ(tλ) to bound the Mpl loss by:
Mpl(z, θ,S) ≤ max(s(z, θ, pS)/4, 0). (7)
3Training samples are those from the training dataset.
The proof of Equation (7) can be found in the appendix.
Equation (7) points out that the Mpl loss can be bounded
by the measure score. Intuitively, the value of tp(z) can be
seen as a threshold which is used for comparingwith the loss
function with respect to z and the trained parameter θ. From
Equation (7), if the negative log-likelihood of the given sam-
ple z is close to the threshold, i.e., l(z, θ) ≈ tp(z), then the
measure score is close to zero, thus the optimal attack can
not obtain any information other than the prior knowledge
(i.e., P (m = 1) = λ). And when the measure score is sub-
stantially greater/less than zero (i.e., the loss of the given
sample is much lower/higher than the threshold), the opti-
mal attack can gain non-trivial membership information on
z, i.e., P (m = 1|z, θ)≫ λ.
To enable the analysis on the SGLD algorithm, we need to
consider the case of model ensemble used for approximat-
ing Bayesian inference. We further reformulate the above
Equation (7) based on two facts. First, we can use Jensen’s
inequality to obtain:
tp(z) ≤ Eθ∼p[l(z, θ)]. (8)
Second, we note that, when the sample z and parameter θ
are given, the value of l(z, θ) explicitly depends on the pre-
dicted probability with respect to the label y. Here, we de-
note the predicted probability as yˆ = f(x, θ). With a slight
notation abuse, we rewrite the value of l(z, θ) as l˜(y, yˆ).
In the case of SGLD ensemble, yˆ can be obtained by av-
erage outputs of models produced by the SGLD algorithm.
Then, combining with Equation (8) and slightly modifying
the above derivation (i.e. replacing θ with yˆ ), we can refor-
mulate the inequality in Equation (7) as:
M˜pl(z, yˆ,S) ≤ max(s˜(z, yˆ, pS)/4, 0), (9)
where:
s˜(z, yˆ, pS) = Eθ∼pS [l(z, θ)]− l˜(y, yˆ), (10)
where yˆ is the average output of models sampled using
SGLD. In contrast to Equation (7) that can only be applied
to the context of the single model, we can leverage Equa-
tion (9) to analyze the information leakage of the ensembled
models4. This is appealing for the analysis of SGLD, since
its key feature is to approximate the Bayesian inference via
ensembling the models produced by SGLD after the burn-in
phase (Welling and Teh 2011).
Uniform Bound for the Mpl Loss
Up to now, we can leverage the above analytical framework
to quantify the information leakage of the trained model
in terms of the membership privacy loss. In this part, for
the model trained using SGLD, we aim to give a uniform
bound of the Mpl loss for arbitrary sample in the worst
case. Here, the worst case refers to the shadow dataset S
held by the attack is a leave-one-out version of the origi-
nal training dataset D, i.e., S is obtained by removing one
sample from D. Without loss of generality, we assume the
removed sample is zn, i.e. S = D/zn. Here, we assume
4Because Equation (9) only depends on the output vector.
that the samples in S are all from the training dataset, since
the posterior pS (Equation (5)) does not depend on the sam-
ples from the hold-out set. The analysis can be easily ex-
tended to other scenarios (e.g., S has samples from the
hold-out dataset). To introduce the following results, we first
give a commonly used assumption presented in the prior
work (Wang, Fienberg, and Smola 2015).
Assumption 1 We assume z is sampled from the space
Z and θ is sampled from the SGLD algorithm. This as-
sumption limits the negative log-likelihood to be bounded,
i.e., supz∈Z,θ |l(z, θ)| ≤ B. The step sizes {ǫt} in Equa-
tion (2) decrease and satisfy: 1)
∑∞
t=1 ǫt = ∞, and 2)
limL→∞
∑L
t=1 ǫ
2
t
St
= 0, where St =
∑L
t=1 ǫt is the sum
of the step sizes.
Formally, based on the above settings, we introduce themain
theoretical finding as the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Uniform bound in expectation) Given S =
D/zn and model parameters {θt}
t0+L
t=t0 generated by SGLD
after the burn-in phase that starts from the t0-th itera-
tion. We denote the sampling process as θ ∼ SGLD. yˆ is
the weighted average output using these parameters, i.e.,
yˆ =
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫt
SL
f(x, θt), where SL =
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫt . Under
Assumption 1, we can bound the expectation of theMpl loss
for any sample z by a uniform constantMSGLD:
ESGLD[M˜pl(z, yˆ,S)] ≤MSGLD, (11)
MSGLD =
B
4
(e2B − 1) +O(
1
SL
+
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫ2t
SL
). (12)
The expectation is with respect to the randomness of SGLD
(i.e., sampling different parameters to compute the pre-
dicted value yˆ). Here, for simplicity, Theorem 1 is for the
case of decreasing-step-size (Welling and Teh 2011) and we
can easily extend this theorem to the case of constant-step-
size based on the prior work (Sato and Nakagawa 2014). To
given a proof of Theorem 1, we first introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Bound of the leave-one-out er-
ror) (Mou et al. 2018) Given S = D/zn, under Assumption
1, we can bound the leave-one-out error (i.e. the posterior
average difference with respect to these two datasets) as:
|Eθ∼pS [l(z, θ)]− Eθ∼pD [l(z, θ)]| ≤ B(e
2B − 1). (13)
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in the appendix.
The following lemma is based on previous finite-time er-
ror analysis of SGLD (Chen, Ding, and Carin 2015).
Lemma 3 (Finite-time error analy-
sis) (Chen, Ding, and Carin 2015) Given model parameters
{θt}Lt=t0 ∼ SGLD generated by SGLD after the burn-in
phase and the predicted value lˆ =
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫt
SL
l(z, θt).
SL =
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫt is the sum of the step sizes. Then we have:
|ESGLD[lˆ]−Eθ∼pD [l(z, θ)]| = O(
1
SL
+
∑t0+L
t=t0
ǫ2t
SL
). (14)
Here, with the help of the above two lemmas, we demon-
strate the roadmap to accomplish the proof of Theorem 1.
The details of the proof can be found in the appendix.
Proof 1 (Sketch proof of Theorem 1): Based on Equa-
tion (9), we can first bound the measure score, which can
be further used for bounding the Mpl loss.
To bound the measure score, we can decompose Equa-
tion (10) into the leave-one-out error and the approximation
error:
s˜(z, yˆ, pS) = Eθ∼pS [l(z, θ)]− Eθ∼pD [l(z, θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
leave−one−out error
+ Eθ∼pD [l(z, θ)]− l˜(y, yˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
approximation error
.
Then we can obtain the bounds for these two errors indi-
vidually. First, we notice that the leave-one-out error can be
bounded based on Lemma 1. Then the approximation error
can be further decomposed into:
Eθ∼pD [l(z, θ)]− lˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Factor1
+ lˆ− l˜(y, yˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Factor2
.
Note that factor 1 can be bounded via Lemma 2 when tak-
ing the expectation over parameters generated by SGLD (the
boundedness is ensured by Assumption 1 and Lemma 3
jointly).
The boundedness of factor 2 is ensured by the bounded-
ness of the negative log-likelihood and the boundedness of
the variance of SGLD (see details in the appendix).
Therefore we can obtain the bound of the measure score
in the context of SGLD model ensemble.
Other Theoretical Perspectives
In this part, we revisit two theoretical results provided in pre-
vious works, the generalization of SGLD (Mou et al. 2018)
and the DP-SGLD (Wang, Fienberg, and Smola 2015). We
will show how to give a unified interpretation of these re-
sults from the aspect of membership privacy.
Connection to Differential Privacy. Previously,
Wang, Fienberg, and Smola (2015) presented DP-SGLD,
which modifies the existing SGLD algorithm to satisfy dif-
ferential privacy (Dwork 2011). The key idea of DP-SGLD
is to calibrate the magnitude of the injected Gaussian noise
and use the strong composition theory to obtain the privacy
budget. Here, we show that DP-SGLD can also preserve
membership privacy in terms of the boundedness of the Mpl
loss. Intuitively, since DP-SGLD satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, each sample in the training dataset will have
a limited impact on the learned model. Therefore, it is
more difficult to detect useful membership information of
an individual sample. This intuition can be theoretically
interpreted using the following property:
Property 1 (DP-SGLD) Given θ learned using (ǫ, δ)-DP-
SGLD, then the following inequality holds with probability
1− δ:
Mpl(z, θ,S) ≤
ǫ
4
. (15)
The proof of this property can be found in the appendix.
Here we only consider the case of a single model without
model ensemble. This theorem can also be extended to the
case of model ensemble by using the composition theory of
differential privacy.
A View From Generalization. Previous works have val-
idated the connection between the overfitting and the
information leakage of DNN models (Wu et al. 2019a;
Yeom et al. 2018). In the realm of membership privacy,
Long et al. (2018) also pointed out that overfitting is a suffi-
cient condition for exposing membership information of the
training dataset. This finding inspires us to understand why
SGLD works for preventing the membership attack from
the view of the generalization theory. Specifically, based on
the prior work (Mou et al. 2018), we can prove that SGLD
can provide the property of uniform stability. Armed with
the stability learning theory (Shalev-Shwartz et al. 2010),
Mou et al. (2018) further provided an expectation bound for
the generalization error of the SGLD algorithm. Since the
generalization error can be bounded, it is challenging for the
attacker to notice the output’s (w.r.t. the model) difference
between the training and hold-out datasets, which further
prevents the membership attack (e.g., the threshold attack
conducted in our experiments). Therefore, from the view of
the generalization bound, we can understand the effective-
ness of SGLD to prevent the membership attack.
Evaluation
Experimental Settings
Datasets. In this paper, we choose datasets from sce-
narios where data privacy is important, such as finan-
cial and medical data analysis. Specifically, we select
two datasets as our benchmarks, namely, German Credit
dataset (Dua and Graff 2017) and IDC dataset5.
The German Credit dataset consists of 1, 000 applications
for credit cards. Each application is labeled with good or bad
credit. We consider the classification task to identify “good
credit” applications. We randomly split the whole dataset
into training (400 applications), hold-out/validation (300 ap-
plications), and test (300 applications) sets. Here, the hold-
out dataset can be used for either validation or building the
“shadow” attack model (Shokri et al. 2017).
IDC dataset is used for invasive ductal carcinoma
(IDC) classification. This dataset contains 277,524
patches of 50 × 50 pixels (198,738 IDC-negative and
78,786 IDC-positive). Following the setting of the work
(Leino and Fredrikson 2019), we split the whole dataset into
training, validation (hold-out), and test sets. To be specific,
the training dataset consists of 10, 788 positive patches
and 29, 164 negative patches. The test dataset consists of
11, 595 positive patches and 31, 825 negative patches. The
remain patches are used as the hold-out dataset.
Model Setup. For the German Credit
dataset (Dua and Graff 2017), we choose a three-layer
fully-connected neural network as the model architecture.
5
http://www.andrewjanowczyk.com/use-case-6-
invasive-ductal-carcinoma-idc-segmentation/
For comparison, we train the model using both SGLD
and SGD variants. All these training strategies share the
following hyper-parameters: the mini-batch is set to 32 and
the epoch number is set to 30. The learning rate decreases
by half every 5 epochs. For SGLD, the variance of the prior
is set to 1.0. The initial learning rate is set to 1× 10−3.
For the IDC dataset, since the training dataset comprises
image data, we choose a typical residual convolutional neu-
ral network, ResNet-18 (He et al. 2016). The mini-batch is
set to 128 and the epoch number is set to 100. Data augmen-
tation is not used. The learning rate decreases by half every
20 epochs. For SGLD, the variance σ2 of the prior is set to
1.0. The initial learning rate is set to 1× 10−4.
Attack Setup. The key part of our experiments is to quan-
titatively evaluate the information leakage of the model
trained using different methods. In practice, we found that a
straightforward attack, threshold attack (Yeom et al. 2018),
suffices to support our theoretical findings. The threshold
attack has already been used in various previous works
(Yeom et al. 2018). This attack is based on the intuition, i.e.,
a sample with lower loss is more likely to belong to the train-
ing dataset. We denote A as the attacker and the threshold
attack proceeds as follows (here, we use the consistent nota-
tions as in the theoretical analysis):
• Given a specific sample z and its predicted probability yˆ
computed by the model.
• A calculates the normalized loss n = l˜(y, yˆ)/B, whereB
is the bound for the negative log-likelihood.
• A selects a threshold t and outputs 1 (indicates the sample
is a training sample) if n ≤ t. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
The threshold attack is evaluated on the training dataset and
the test dataset. Note that we can choose different threshold
t to obtain different attack models. Naturally, we can plot
the ROC curve of these attack results and use the area un-
der the ROC curve (AUC) as an indicator of the information
leakage. Moreover, we assume that the attacker can obtain
the average value of l˜(y, yˆ) on the training dataset. Thus we
can directly use this value as a threshold to build the attack
model, and compute the F1 score and accuracy of the at-
tack model to quantify the amount of information leakage.
In summary, we use three metrics to evaluate the informa-
tion leakage of a learned model, namely, the AUC value, the
F1 score, and the accuracy.
Experimental Results
In Table 1 and 2, Dropout denotes adding Dropout
layers into the network architecture. For ResNet-
18, we insert Dropout between convolutional lay-
ers and set the drop ratio to 0.3 following the
work (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016). SGLD+ rep-
resents ensembling models obtained by SGLD. In practice,
we found that ensembling 3 models suffices to our case, thus
we use the models obtained in the last three iterations and
average their outputs for the final prediction. In contrast to
the decreasing step size discussed in the theoretical analysis,
we use the constant step size in practice following prior
works (Sato and Nakagawa 2014). For a fair comparison
Table 1: Results of the threshold attack on the GermanCredit
dataset. SGLD+ represents model ensemble.
Strategy
Attack Metric Model Metric
AUC F1 Acc Train Test Gap
SGD 0.677 0.685 0.646 1.000 0.734 0.266
SGD+ 0.677 0.684 0.645 1.000 0.720 0.280
Dropout 0.527 0.567 0.527 0.859 0.747 0.112
RMSprop 0.589 0.677 0.627 0.965 0.749 0.216
SGLD 0.536 0.598 0.539 0.811 0.736 0.075
SGLD+ 0.536 0.564 0.526 0.839 0.751 0.087
pSGLD 0.551 0.600 0.550 0.858 0.753 0.105
pSGLD+ 0.550 0.568 0.539 0.859 0.758 0.101
with SGLD+, we also apply the same ensemble strategy to
the case of SGD (denoted as SGD+).
German Credit Dataset. The overall results of the German
Credit dataset are shown in Table 1. We observe that the use
of SGLD can prevent the information leakage of the train-
ing dataset, based on the above attack metrics for evaluating
the information leakage. In contrast to SGD, SGLD signif-
icantly reduces the AUC score of the threshold attack from
0.677 to 0.536, while achieves comparable model accuracy.
We can also observe consistent performance boost and in-
formation leakage reduction when model ensemble is used.
For example, SGLD+ decreases the F1 score of the threshold
attack (from 0.598 to 0.564) while achieves a slight model
accuracy increase (from 0.736 to 0.751).
IDC Dataset. The overall results are shown in Table 2.
SGLD can significantly reduce the information leakage in
contrast to SGD, in terms of the aforementioned metrics for
evaluating the attack performance. For example, compared
with SGD, SGLD remarkably reduces the AUC value of
threshold attack from 0.669 to 0.641 while achieving com-
parable model accuracy. We also observe a slight model ac-
curacy improvementwhen the ensemble strategy is used (see
the results of SGLD+). It is worth noting that Dropout is not
effective in reducing the information leakage and improv-
ing the performance in this case (see more discussions in the
following subsection).
All these empirical results validate our theoretical find-
ings, i.e., the model trained using SGLD can preserve mem-
bership privacy to a certain extent.
Discussions
SGLD Variants. The vanilla SGLD algorithm updates all
parameters with the same step size, which always leads to
inefficient optimization since these parameters have differ-
ent curvature. pSGLD (Li et al. 2016a) solves this problem
by applying the preconditioner to each parameter in the op-
timization process. In this paper, we also demonstrate some
numerical results of pSGLD. Since pSGLD can be seen as
a noisy version of the RMSprop algorithm, we also show
the results of RMSprop. From Table 1, we observe that pS-
GLD can improve the test accuracy in contrast to the vanilla
SGLD. We infer that the accuracy boost comes from the use
Table 2: Results of the threshold attack on the IDC dataset.
SGLD+ represents model ensemble.
Strategy
Attack Metric Model Metric
AUC F1 Acc Train Test Gap
SGD 0.669 0.716 0.646 0.993 0.823 0.170
SGD+ 0.665 0.714 0.638 0.998 0.837 0.161
Dropout 0.662 0.711 0.634 0.994 0.818 0.176
RMSprop 0.674 0.715 0.652 0.992 0.818 0.174
SGLD 0.641 0.669 0.620 0.973 0.817 0.156
SGLD+ 0.643 0.658 0.617 0.981 0.825 0.156
pSGLD 0.652 0.697 0.641 0.982 0.824 0.158
pSGLD+ 0.648 0.692 0.640 0.987 0.830 0.157
of the preconditioner which can improve the optimization
efficiency. However, the accuracy boost accompanies with
more information leakage in terms of the above attack met-
rics. For example, comparing with SGLD, pSGLD increases
the AUC value of the attack model from 0.536 to 0.551.
From the updating rule of pSGLD (Li et al. 2016a), pSGLD
usesmore information of the gradient comparedwith SGLD,
which causes the increase of the information leakage.
Effectiveness of Dropout. As shown in Table 1 and
2, Dropout demonstrates different effects on these two
tasks since two different types of model architectures
are used. According to previous works, Dropout is less
effective on the fully convolutional neural network in
which the fully-connected layer only exists in the last
layer. (Ghiasi, Lin, and Le 2018). This conclusion coincides
with our observation, i.e., the Dropout cannot boost the per-
formance on the ResNet-18model for the IDC classification.
On the contrary, in the case of the German Credit dataset,
one notable observation is that Dropout can also drastically
reduce the information leakage (see Dropout in Table 1).
This result is not surprising to us, since Dropout can be
seen as an implicit Bayesian inference based on the prior
work (Gal and Ghahramani 2016). This suggests that we can
use Dropout as an effective way to preserve the membership
privacy for fully-connected networks (i.e. multilayer percep-
tron).
Other Attacks. In the above analysis, we found that the sim-
ple threshold attack suffices to detect some useful member-
ship information in our case. We also conduct experiments
on other membership attack methods, such as shadow train-
ing method proposed in the prior work (Shokri et al. 2017).
And we found that SGLD is also effective to prevent such an
attack in practice.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a novel perspective to study the
properties of SGLD from the membership privacy. To this
end, we first built the theoretical framework to analyze the
information leakage of a learned model. We then employed
this framework to prove that the model learned using SGLD
can prevent the membership attack to a certain extent. Ex-
periments on different real-world datasets have verified our
theoretical findings. Moreover, our paper shed light on an
interesting perspective of membership privacy to explain be-
haviors of various deep learning algorithms, which indicates
a new direction for the explainable deep learning research.
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